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Restricting Shareholder Voting Rights Under the
Utah Revised Business Corporation Act
THE BACKGROUND
OF THE UTAHREVISED
I. INTRODUCTION:
BUSINESSCORPORATION
ACT
In 1992 the Utah Legislature repealed the Utah Business
Corporation Act and enacted in its place the Utah Revised
Business Corporation Act ("Utah Revised Act").' The Utah
Revised Act was drafted by the Utah Business Corporation Act
Revision Committee ("Revision Committee"), established
through the Business Law Section of the Utah State Bar.2 The
Revision Committee based the Utah Revised Act on the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act ("Model Act"), which was
adopted in 1984 by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
~
American Bar Association's Business Law S e ~ t i o n .Utah's
Revised Act is essentially an adoption of the ABA's Model Act.4
But the Revision Committee modified various provisions of the
Model Act to respond to local needs and c o n ~ e r n s .One
~
of
these changes involves restrictions on shareholder voting.
The Utah Revised Act, like the Model Act, permits
corporations to create shares designated as n ~ n v o t i n g ,but
~
under both the Model Act and the Utah Revised Act even
nonvoting shares have a right to vote as separate "voting
groups" on certain kinds of amendments.? However, Utah's
Revision Committee included a provision in subsection 1004(5)
of the Utah Revised Act that was not part of the ABA's Model
Act and that does not appear in the corporations code of any
1. H.B. 50, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 UTAH LEG. REP. 45 (enacted as
UTAHCODEANN. 5 16-10a-101 to -1705 (1995)).
2. UTAHBUSINESSCORPORATION
C O ~ I I T E COMMENTARY
E,
TO
ACT REVISION
UTAHREVISEDBUSINESSCORPORATION
ACT 1 (1992) [hereinafter COMMENTARY
TO
REVISED ACT].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. UTAHCODEANN. 5 16-10a-601(3).
7. Id. 9 16-10a-1004(1); REVISEDMODELBUSINESS CORP. ACT 5 10.04(a)
(Comm. on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corp., Banking and Business Law of
the Am. Bar Ass'n 1984).
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other state.8 On its face, this provision seems to make it
possible for corporations to create shares with no voting rights
of any kind-not even the limited right to form separate voting
group^.^ Unfortunately, the language of the statute is
ambiguous, and the commentary published with the statute,
which was written for the Model Act and not modified to
account for changes in the Utah Revised Act,'' only adds to
the ambiguity. In fact, the commentary leaves readers with the
impression that the legislature intended just the opposite of
what the statute says." Nevertheless, a close examination of
the statute indicates that Utah corporations can in fact create
shares without any voting rights a t all, provided that the
shareholders to whom the shares are issued have notice of the
restrictions associated with their shares or give their approval
for such restrictions to be imposed.
This Comment argues that the drafters of Utah's Revised
Act have attempted to create a means by which corporations
may, subject to the prior notice or approval of the affected
class, restrict shareholders from voting in even the limited
capacity of voting groups. Unfortunately, the statute as drafted
creates a level of ambiguity that may prevent corporations from
taking advantage of this innovative provision.
11. SHAREHOLDER
VOTINGRIGHTSUNDERTHE UTAHREVISED
ACTAND THE MODELACT
Under Utah's Revised Act, as under the ABA's Model Act,
shareholders are classified within one or more classes of
shares, which classes may be further subdivided into various
"series."" These classes and series are distinguished by the
"preferences, limitations, and relative rights"-including voting
rights-accorded
to each in the company's articles of
incorporation. The Utah Revised Act states that "[tlhe articles
of incorporation may authorize one or more classes of shares
and one or more series of shares within any class that: (a) have
special, conditional, or limited voting rights, or no right to vote,

8. UTAHCODEANN. $ 16-10a-1004(5)
(Supp. 1994).
9. See id.
10. See discussion infia part 1II.A.l.
11. See COMMENTARY
TO REVISEDACT, supra note 2, at 106-07.
12. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 16-10a-601(1),(3) (Supp. 1994); see also REVISED
MODELBUSINESS CORPORATION
ACT, supra note 7, $ 6.01(a).
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except to the extent prohibited by this chapter."13 Thus
articles of incorporation may designate certain shares as
nonvoting, but this designation is subject to certain limitations.
The official commentaries published with both the Model
Act and the Utah Revised Act state that "[tlhis 'except' clause
refers to the provisions in the [Utah] Revised Act that permit
shares that are designated to be nonvoting to vote as separate
voting groups on amendments to articles of incorporation and
other organic changes in the corporation that directly affect
that class (see sections 726 and 1004)."14 Unfortunately,
sections 726 and 1004 of the Utah Revised Act are ambiguous
about the extent to which shareholder voting rights may be
limited.

A. Section 1004: The Voting Group Entitlement
Section 726 simply explains the mechanics of voting by
"voting group^."'^ The substantive provisions of the voting
group entitlement are contained in section 1004, which sets
forth the nine kinds of amendments upon which shares designated as nonvoting may nevertheless vote as a separate voting
group.16 Section 1004 is straightforward, and makes sense

13. UTAHCODEANN. 8 16-10a-601(3).
14. COMMENTARY
TO REVISEDACT, supra note 2, a t 28; REVISEDMODEL
BUSMESSCOW. ACT, supra note 7, 8 6.01 cmt. 3.b, at 89.
15. See UTAH CODEANN. 8 16-10a-726; COMMENTARY
TO REVISED ACT, supra
note 2, at 61-63. "Section 726(2) basically requires that if more than one voting
group is entitled to vote on a matter, favorable action on a matter is taken only
when it is voted upon favorably by each voting group, counted separately." Id. at
61. A class or series of shareholders voting as a separate voting group is thus able
to block an amendment to the articles of incorporation even when a majority of
the shareholders favors it.
16. UTAH CODEANN. 8 16-10a-1004(1). The text of this subsection reads as
follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), the holders of the outstanding shares of a class are entitled to vote as a separate voting group,
if shareholder voting is otherwise required by this chapter, on a proposed
amendment if the amendment would:
(a) increase or decrease the aggregate number of authorized shares of
the class;
(b) effect an exchange or reclassification of all or part of the shares of
the class into shares of another class;
(c) effect an exchange or reclassification, or create the right of exchange, of all or part of the shares of another class into shares of the
class;
(d) change the designation, rights, preferences, or limitations of all or
part of the shares of the class;
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from a policy standpoint since the nine situations in which the
section creates a separate voting group all represent potential
amendments that would directly and adversely affect the given
class.l7
As the Official Comment to section 1004 explains: "The
right to vote as a separate voting group provides a major protection for classes or series of shares with preferential rights or
classes or series of limited or nonvoting shares against amendments that are especially burdensome to that lass."'^ It
would be manifestly unfair for the board of directors or other
unaffected shareholders to unilaterally amend the articles of
incorporation in a way that would seriously depreciate the
value of the nonvoting shares. Section 1004 gives nonvoting
shareholders the power, by forming a separate voting group, to
prevent the other shareholders from adopting such amendments.
These general provisions, common to both the Model Act
and the Utah Revised Act, may be summarized by saying that
while corporations may create classes and series of shares with
no voting rights under section 601, section 1004 guarantees
that even these "nonvoting" shareholders have the limited right
to form voting groups to block certain kinds of amendments
that would directly and adversely affect the value of their
shares.lg It is clear that under Utah law, as under the Model
Act, shareholder voting rights may at least be limited to the

(e) change the shares of all or part of the class into a different number of shares of the same class;
(f) create a new class of shares having rights or preferences with respect to distributions or to dissolution that are prior, superior, or
substantially equal to the shares of the class;
(g) increase the rights, preferences, or number of authorized shares of
any class that, after giving effect to the amendment, have rights or
preferences with respect to distributions or to dissolution that are
prior, superior, or substantially equal to the shares of the class;
(h) limit or deny an existing preemptive right of all or part of the
share of the class; or
(i) cancel or otherwise affect rights to distributions or dividends that
have accumulated but not yet been declared on all or part of the
shares of the class.
UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-10a-1004(l)(a)-(i);see also REVISED MODEL BUSINESSCORP.
ACT, supra note 7, 5 6.01(a)(l)-(9).
17. See UTAHCODE ANN. 5 16-10a-1004(l)(a)-(i).
18. COMMENTARYTO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t 107; REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS COW. ACT, supra note 7, 5 10.04 cmt. a t 275.
19. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-10a-1004(l)(a)-(i) with REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, 5 10.04(a)(l)-(9).
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right to vote as a separate voting group under subsection
1004(1), but it is not as easy to determine whether or to what
extent Utah law permits further limitations of shareholder
voting rights.

B. Subsection 1004(5): An Exception to the Voting Group
Entitlement?
Section 1004 of the Utah Code differs in important ways
from the analogous section of the Model Act promulgated by
the
In subsection 1004(5) the drafters of Utah's Revised Act appear to have created an exception to the voting
group rights that would evidently permit corporations to restrict shareholder voting rights even more completely than
under the Model Act. The changes made to the Utah Revised
Act are incomplete, however, and corporations are left uncertain as to whether the ostensible exception to the voting group
right actually exists.
Section 1004 of Utah's Revised Act, unlike the corresponding section of the Model Act, contains language suggesting that
the voting group entitlement is only a qualified right: voting
group rights are guaranteed "[elxcept as otherwise provided in
Subsection (5)."21Subsection (5) itself is unique to the Utah
Code and states:
Notwithstanding the rights granted by this section to holders
of the outstanding shares of a class or series to vote as a
separate voting group, the rights may be otherwise restricted
if so provided in the original articles of incorporation, in any
amendment thereto which created the class or series or which
was adopted prior t o the issuance of any shares of the class or
series, or in any amendment thereto which was authorized by
a resolution or resolutions adopted by the affirmative vote of
the holders of a majority of the class or series."

This subsection appears directly to contradict subsection
1004(4),which states that "a class or series of shares is entitled
to the voting rights granted by this section although the articles of incorporation provide that the shares are nonvoting

20. Compare UTAHCODEANN. 8 16-10a-1004(5) with REVISEDMODELBUSIACT,supra note 7, 8 10.04 (which has no subsection analogous to the
Utah Revised Act's 5 1004(5)).
21. UTAHCODEANN. 8 16-10a-1004(1),(4).
22. Id. § 16-10a-1004(5).

NESS CORP.
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share^."^^ However, subsections (1) and (4), which establish
the voting group right, describe subsection (5) as an exception
to that right; both subsections begin with the caveat: "Except
as otherwise provided in Subsection (5) . . . ."24 Reading these
"except" clauses together with the language of subsection (5),
Utah's Revised Act appears to say that shareholders may vote
on certain types of amendments even if the articles of incorporation designate the shares as nonvoting, except when the
articles of incorporation say that they can't. This is somewhat
baffling.

While this conflict between subsections 1004(4)and 1004(5)
is potentially confusing, there are really only two possible readings of the section. Either the articles of incorporation can
restrict shareholders from voting on the nine kinds of arnendments set forth in 1004(1) or they cannot. To put it another
way, subsection 1004(5) either creates an exception to the right
to vote as a separate voting group or it leaves that right intact
and unconditionally guaranteed.
On the one hand, the language in subsection 1004(5)which
states that "[nlotwithstanding the rights granted by this section . . . to vote as a separate voting group, [shareholder voting]
rights may be otherwise restricted if so provided in the original
articles of in~orporation,"~~
suggests that, while group voting
rights are guaranteed under the nine circumstances listed in
subsection (I), the voting rights of shareholders may be restricted in any other way. This reading would favor the persistence of an unconditional right, under the specified conditions, to vote in voting groups.
On the other hand, subsection (5) could be treated as an
explicit exception to the voting group entitlement set forth in
subsection (1). This interpretation is perhaps less evident from
the language on the face of the subsection, but reading the
entire statute according to the principles of statutory construction established in Utah case law suggests the existence of a

23. Id. § 16-10a-1004(4); see also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra
note 7, 5 10.04(d).
24. Compare UTAH CODE A m . $ 16-10a-1004(1), (4) with REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT,supra note 7, 8 10.04(a), (dl.
25. UTAHCODE ANN. 5 16-10a-1004(5).
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legislative intent to permit companies, subject to certain procedural restrictions and through their articles of incorporation,
to create classes or series of shares with no rights to vote on
any matters, not even on the nine types of critical amendments
set forth in 1004(1).

A. Statutory Construction: Legislative Intent
The first principle of statutory interpretation is to somehow divine the legislature's intent in enacting the law. The
Utah Supreme Court has stated:
This court's primary responsibility in construing legislative
enactments is to give effect to the legislature's underlying
intent. "In determining the legislative intent of the statute,
'the statute should be considered in the light of the purpose it
was designed to serve and so applied as to carry out that
purpose if it can be done consistent with its lang~age?"~

1. Commentary to the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act
As an aid in interpreting the Utah Revised Act, the Revision Committee, in adopting the Model Act, also adopted the
Official Comments published with the Model Act. Of these comments, Utah's Revision Committee states the following:
The Model Act is accompanied by Official Comments that
were considered, approved and adopted by the [ABA] Committee on Corporate Laws. We believe that such a commentary can be helphl to business persons and legal practitioners
trying to understand, interpret and comply with the provisions of the [UtahJ Revised Act, and the availability of such a
commentary was a motivating factor in enacting a corporations code based on the Model Act. Accordingly, the commentary to the Model Act was been [sic] reproduced, revised and
adapted for use with the [Utah] Revised Act. . . .
This commentary is intended to provide an explanation
of the meaning, purpose, application and historical development of referenced sections of the [Utah] Revised Act. It also

26. Savage Indus. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 1991)
(citing Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980); Salt Lake City
v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co.
v. Utah Ins. Gum. Ass'n, 564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977); and quoting Utah Power
& Light v. Municipal Power Sys., 784 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah 1989)(quoting Johnson
v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1966))).
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describes some of the substantive decisions made in the
drafting of the [Utah] Revised Act and highlights certain
differences between the Model Act, the [Utah] Revised Act
and the Prior Act. The Utah legislature has endorsed the use
of this commentary as an aid in understanding and interpreting the Wtah] Revised Act, and directed that it be published
as a companion to the [Utah] Revised

This suggests that the commentary would be a good source to
examine for indications of the legislative intent behind changes
to the Model Act. Unfortunately, an examination of the commentary to section 1004 only compounds the confusion of the
Utah Revised Act.
At first glance, the commentary to subsection 1004(4)
seems to suggest an unconditional right to vote in voting
groups, and to flatly contradict the exception language of subsections 1004(1), (4) and (5). The commentary to section 1004 of
the Utah Revised Act states in part:
Shares are entitled to vote as separate voting groups under
this section even though they are designated as nonvoting
shares in the articles of incorporation, or the articles of incorporation purport to deny them entirely the right to vote on
the proposal in question, or purport to allow other classes or
series of shares to vote as part of the same voting

The commentary further states:
Section 1004(4) makes clear that the limited right to vote by
separate voting groups provided by section 1004 may not be
narrowed or eliminated by the articles of incorporation. Even
if a class or series of shares is described as "nonvoting" and
the articles purport to make that class or series nonvoting
"for all purposes," that class or series nevertheless has the
limited voting right provided by this section.29

This language, which is common to both the Model Act and the
Utah Revised Act, seems to indicate that the right to vote in
voting groups cannot be denied, and that is undoubtedly its
intent and effect in the Official Comments to the Model Act.

27. COMMENTARY
TO REVISEDACT, supra note 2, a t 1.
28. Id. at 106-07; see also REVISEDMODELBUSINESS COW. ACT, supra note 7,
$ 10.04 cmt. a t 275.
TO REVISEDACT, supra note 2, a t 107; see also REVISED
29. COMMENTARY
MODELBUSINESSCOW. ACT, supra note 7, $ 10.04 cmt. a t 276.
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However, section 1004 of the Utah Revised Act differs from
the Model Act in significant ways, most notably by the addition
of subsection (5). Unfortunately, the commentary published
with Utah's Revised Act fails to account for or even reflect
these changes.30 In fact, the commentary to section 1004 of
the Utah Revised Act merely reproduces the Official Comments
to the Model Act verbatim. These comments provide a helpful
discussion on each of the subsections (1)through (4), but quite
naturally fail to mention anything about Utah's unique subsection (5).31
This omission suggests that the commentary published
with Utah's Revised Act is incomplete. The failure of the commentary to explain subsection (5) seems to indicate that the
discussion in the commentary is there simply by default, or as
a mere vestige of the Model Act. One is forced to conclude that
the Revision Committee simply reproduced the Official Comment &om the Model Act, and that its continuing and unaltered presence in the commentary to Utah's Revised Act is the
result of an oversight by the Revision Committee rather than
any indication of legislative intent. If this is the case, the commentary to section 1004 can be of limited help in understanding the legislative intent behind the voting group provisions of
that section.32One is forced to look elsewhere for indications
of legislative intent.
2. Legislative history

The legislative history of the Utah Revised Act indicates
that it was not so much the legislature as the Utah Business
Corporation Act Revision C o ~ n m i t t e ethat
~ ~ reviewed the Mod-

30. See COMMENTARY
TO REVISEDACT, supra note 2, a t 107.
31. See id.; cf: REVISEDMODELBUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, 8 10.06
cmt.
TO REVISEDACT, supra note 2, a t 106-07.
32. See COMMENTARY
33. The Utah Business Corporation Act Revision Committee was "established
through the Business Law Section of the Utah State Bar, in cooperation with Representative Nancy Lyon and the Legislative Research and General Counsel's Office."
COMMENTARY
TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t 1.
The Revision Committee was comprised of "private attorneys specializing in the
business law area; in-house attorneys for several large Utah corporations, including
Union Pacific Railroad Company, Questar Corporation, and Huntsman Chemical
Corporation; a law professor from Brigham Young University's J. Reuben Clark
School of Law [Professor David Thomas]; House Representative Nancy Lyon;
George Danielson of the Utah Legislative Research and General Counsel's ofice;
and Peter Van Alstyne, Director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial
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el Act and drafted this particular legislation. The Revision
Committee made various modifications to the Model Act in
order to "address concerns and issues raised by Committee
members, to retain certain . . . provisions [of the former Utah
Business Corporation Act of 19611 considered to be appropriate,
to incorporate statutory provisions that have been proposed in
Colorado and adopted in other states, and to respond to comments received by interested Utah companies and individua l ~ . One
" ~ ~of these modifications clearly was the addition of
subsection (5) to section 1004 of the Utah Revised Act.
There was no floor debate on section 1004 in either the
Utah House of Representatives or the Utah Senate. Nor is
there a record of any discussion of the changes to that section
in committee. The changes to section 1004 were made by the
Revision Committee in an early drafk of the bill, but no explanation accompanies the alteration^.^^ Interviews with members of the drafting committee who worked specifically on chapter 10 of the bill revealed no pertinent documentation that
would help with the interpretation of section 1 0 0 4 . ~ ~
However, Dorothy Pleshe, who served on the drafting committee that worked specifically on chapter 10, recalled that the

Code." P. CHRISTIANANDERSON,INTRODUCTION
TO PROPOSED
NEW UTAH REVISED
BUSINESS CORPORATION
ACT 1 (November 5, 1991) (on file with the Utah Legislative Research and General Counsel's Office (H.B. 50, 1992)).
TO REVISED ACT, supra note 2, a t 1.
34. COMMENTARY
35. See Draft: Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 1991, 138-40 (December
5, 1990) (copy on file with Utah Legislative Research and General Counsel's Office
(H.B. 50, 1992)).
36. Members of the Revision Committee that worked specifically on Chapter
10 of the act included Connie Holbrook of Mountain FueVQuestar, Steve Goodsell
of Union Pacific, and Dorothy Pleshe of the law firm of Callister Nebeker &
McCullough. Julie Matis of VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, J. Gordon
Hansen of Parsons Behle & Latimer, and Randall Romrell of Huntsman Chemical
worked on the related provisions of Chapter 11.
Most of the members of the Revision Committee with whom I spoke had no
recollection of the changes to 5 1004 or of the reasons for those changes, nor had
they preserved any records of the change. Telephone interview with George
Danielson, former Director, Utah Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel (July 18, 1995); telephone interview with P. Christian Anderson, Attorney,
Holme Roberts & Owen, Chair of Utah Business Act Revision Committee, Utah
State Bar Association (July 18, 1995); telephone interview with Connie Cannon
Holbrook, Legal Department, Mountain FueVQuestar Corp. (July 18, 1995); telephone interview with Steven A. Goodsell, Legal Department, Union Pacific Corp.
(July 19, 1995); telephone interview with Julie Matis, Attorney, VanCott Bagley
Cornwall & McCarthy (August 11, 1995); telephone interview with David Thomas,
Professor of Law, Brigham Young University (July 31, 1995); telephone interview
with Randall L. Romrell, Attorney, Huntsman Chemical Corp. (August 9, 1995).
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Revision Committee had intended to give corporations a way to
completely restrict shareholder voting rights.37 Likewise,
Gordon Hansen, a member of the Revision Committee who
worked on the related provisions of chapter 11, indicated that
it was his understanding that if shareholder voting rights were
restricted from the beginning in the original articles of incorporation, shares could be denied the right to vote entirely, even
on issues that directly affect them.38
No other states have adopted provisions similar to Utah's
subsection 1004(5), and no reported cases from any state suggest the existence of any controversy over the rights of voting
groups that may have motivated the Revision Committee to
include this particular modification in the Utah Revised Act.39
The recollection of Dorothy Pleshe was that the changes to the
Model Act were the result of discussions among the Revision
Committee members and were motivated simply by their perception that corporations, especially small corporations and
start-up companies, should be permitted to limit the voting
rights of shareholders so as to give the directors more complete
control of their ~orporations.~~
Ultimately, the commentary published with the Utah Revised Act is of little use in determining the legislative intent
behind the changes to section 1004. This fact, combined with
the lack of meaningful documentation of the legislative history
of subsection 1004(5), makes it difficult to reconstruct any
notion of legislative intent from extrinsic documents. Nevertheless, the recollection of those who served on the Revision Committee is that the Act was drafted with the intention of increasing corporate flexibility. Creating an exception to the voting
group entitlements would comport with this general aim.

37. Telephone interview with Dorothy C. Pleshe, Attorney, Callister Nebeker
& McCullough, member of Utah Business Corporation Act Revision Committee
(August 9, 1995).
38. Telephone interview with J. Gordon Hansen, Attorney, Parsons Behle &
Latimer, member of Utah Business Corporation Act Revision Committee (August 9,
1995).
39. This information is based on various (fruitless) searches of the LEXIS and
Westlaw electronic databases.
40. Telephone Interview with Dorothy C. Pleshe, Attorney, Callister Nebeker
& McCullough, member of Utah Business Corporation Act Revision Committee
(August 9, 1995).
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B. Statutory Construction:
The Interpretation of Critical Words
Utah cases indicate that if nothing in the legislative record
or other history of a statute indicates the legislative intent behind its enactment, the courts will look to the "plain meaning
of the language at issue in the ~tatute."~'
Realizing perhaps
that an attempt to find "plain meaning" within the statutory
language of the Utah Code was unduly optimistic, the courts
have set forth a three-step procedure to be followed in the statutory construction of critical words:
First, terms of related code provisions should be construed in
a harmonious fashion. . . . Second, statutory terms should be
interpreted and applied according to their commonly accepted
meaning unless the ordinary meaning of the term results in
an application that is either "unreasonably confused, inoperable, [lor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the
statute." . . . Third, "[ilf there is doubt or uncertainty as to
the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is
appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its
objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with
its intent and purpose. n42

Analysis of subsection 1004 under each of these three principles indicates that the drafters of the Utah Revised Act intended to create an exception to the voting group rights established
under the Model Act.
1. Construing related provisions harmoniously

In Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. F i n l i n ~ o nthe
~~
Utah Supreme Court established that terms of related code
provisions should be construed harmoniously.* While the
language of section 1004 of the Utah Revised Act suggests two
possible interpretations, neither of them is without a certain
amount of disharmony. Nevertheless, the reading that would

41. Savage Indus. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 1991)
(citing Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 1990);
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988)).
42. State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Grayson
Roper LM. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Utah 1989); Morton
Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah
1991); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991)).
43. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989).
44. Id. at 470-71.

SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS
create an exception to the voting group right is more easily reconcilable with the related code provisions.
If one reads subsection (5) to say that voting group rights
may be restricted in any way other than being restricted from
voting on the nine types of amendments listed in subsection (I),
then the right to vote as a separate voting group on the subsection (1) amendments would be unconditionally guaranteed,
while shareholder voting rights on other, unspecified types of
amendments would be susceptible to an absolute limitation.
This reading would force one to conclude that subsection
(5) is not so much an exception to subsections (1)and (4) as a
reiteration of them. This reading also represents no change
from the Model Act, which also guarantees an unconditional
voting group right with respect to the critical subsection (1)
amendment^.^^ If this is the correct interpretation then subsection (5) is simply surplusage-a redundancy that the drafters of the Utah statute added, perhaps with the object (ironically) of clarifying section 1004 of the Utah Revised Act.
It may be argued that nothing could be more harmonious
than redundancy, but statutory provisions are generally assumed to have independent meaning. Furthermore, harmony
with one statutory term may create disharmony with others. If
subsection 1004(5) is not an exception to subsections (1)and
(4), then it becomes difficult to explain why the drafters of the
Utah Revised Act added the "except" clause to subsections (1)
and (4) of the Model Act. Those subsections state that shareholders may, even if designated as "nonvoting" shares, vote as
a separate voting group on certain matters, "[elxcept as otherwise provided in Subsection (5)."" Under the first interpretation of the statute, it also becomes difficult to account for the
language in subsection (5), which states that "[n]otwithstanding the rights granted by this section," the right to vote in
voting groups may be restri~ted.~?
The second, more liberal, reading of section 1004 would
treat subsection (5) as an explicit exception to the voting group
entitlement set forth in subsections (1)and (4). This reading is
in harmony with the "except as otherwise provided" language
that precedes those two subsections. If subsection (5) is an

45. See REVISED MODELBUSINESS CORP. ACT, supra note 7, $ 10.04 cmt., at
275.
46. UTAHCODE ANN.
47. Id. 5 1004(5).

5 16-10a-1004(1), (4).
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exception (stating that notwithstanding language in subseo
tions (1)and (4), shareholders may be prevented from voting "if
so provided in the articles of incorporation [or] any amendment
theretod8), it appears to swallow the rule of subsection (4),
which states that a shareholder may vote in a separate voting
group "although the articles of incorporation provide that the
shares are nonvoting". An exception cannot logically swallow
the entire rule. Either the articles of incorporation can restrict
voting group rights or they cannot. Thus, for the exception to
make sense, it must be limited to a more narrow object than
the general rule.
Applying this principle to section 1004, subsection (5) must
apply to a narrower set of circumstances than subsections (1)
and (4) if it is to make sense as an exception to those subsections. While such a distinction is perhaps not self-evident in
the language of subsection (5), it is discernable upon close examination. Subsection (4) talks about "the articles of incorporation,"*' and subsection (1) discusses "amendments."" These
may be distinguished from "the original articles of incorporation" discussed in subsection (5) or from an "amendment . . .
which created the class or series or which was adopted prior to
the issuance of any shares of the class or series" or an "amendment . . . which was authorized by a resolution . . . adopted by
the afirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the class or
This distinction suggests that even on those subsection (1)
matters that directly and adversely affect a class or series of
shares, shareholders may be prohibited from voting if the prohibition is documented in such a way that shareholders receive
notice of the restrictions associated with their shares before the
shares are purchased or issued. This may be done by establishing those restrictions in a provision of the original articles of
incorporation drafted at the very inception of the corporation,
or in an amendment adopted at or before the time the class of
shares was created.52
However, notice would be unnecessary if a majority of the
affected class or series had itself approved the voting restric-

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. 5 1004(4).
Id. 5 1004(1).
See id. $ 10046) (emphasis added).
Id.
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tions. Consequently, the second reading of subsection (5), consistent with this purpose, would also allow a corporation to
restrict voting group rights in the articles of incorporation by
"any amendment [of the articles] which was . . . adopted by the
affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the class or ser i e ~ . The
" ~ ~overall effect of this reading is that as long as the
restrictions are placed on the shares before anyone buys them,
or are imposed with the approval of affected shareholders, the
Utah Code permits the complete restriction of shareholder
voting rights.
The second reading is also supported by another "wellestablished rule[ of statutory construction" developed by the
Utah Supreme Court,54 namely, that "specific statutory provisions take precedence over general statutory pro~isions."~~
Applying this rule to section 1004 of the Utah Revised Act, the
provisions of subsection (5) pertaining to "original articles of
incorporation" would take precedence over the general discussion of "articles of incorporation" in subsection (4). Likewise,
the more specific provision in subsection (5), concerning an
"amendment . . . which created the class or series or which was
adopted prior to the issuance of any shares of the class or series," is more specific than the provisions of subsection (1)creating group voting rights for voting on "a proposed amendment," and would thus take precedence over them.56
The more harmonious reading of section 1004 suggests
that the drafters of the Utah Revised Act intended subsection
(5) to create an exception to the voting group entitlement based
on the principle of notice or approval. If this was in fact their
intent, it is unfortunate that they did not make that purpose
more clear in the language or commentary to section 1004.
2. Applying the ordinary meaning of statutory terms
While the arguments for characterizing subsection (5) as
an exception to the rule established in subsections (1)and (4)
are compelling, they might be conclusive but for the incongruity
of the word "otherwise" in the phrase "[n]otwithstanding the
rights granted by this section . . . to vote as a separate voting
group, the rights may be otherwise restricted if so provided in
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992).
Id.
Compare UTAHCODE ANN. 8 16-10a-1004(5) with id. 8 1004(4).
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the original articles of incorporation."57If in fact the drafkers
wrote subsection (5) as an exception to the right to vote in
voting groups, it would have made more sense for them to have
written "notwithstanding the rights granted by this section . . .
to vote as a separate voting group, the rights may nevertheless
be restricted," or simply, "the rights may be restricted."
The Utah Supreme Court has endorsed the "well-established rule of statutory construction that a statutory term
should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused,
inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose
of the statute."58
"Otherwise" usually means "in a different manner" or "in
another way."59 Interpreting subsection (5) according to the
generally accepted meaning of "otherwise" would indicate that
the first suggested interpretation should be applied, allowing
complete restriction of voting rights only for amendments other
than those set forth in subsection (1).Under this reading corporations could not deny any shareholders their right to vote in
voting groups on critical amendments, regardless of what the
articles of incorporation said and regardless of whether the
shareholders were on notice of such purported limitations before they bought their shares.
such an interpretation is
However, as indicated above:'
ultimately both "unreasonably confixsed" and "inoperable," if
not "in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute? Besides being unnecessary and redundant, it contradicts the language added to subsections (1)and (4) that explicitly recognizes an exception to the voting group rights: "Except
as otherwise provided in subsection (5) . . ."62
Moreover, it is possible to construe the word "otherwise" so
as to give the statutory language the effect of the second interpretation. While "otherwise" is primarily defined as "in a differ-

57. UTAH CODEANN. $ 16-10a-1004(5) (emphasis added).
58. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814
P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991) (discussing Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as a
source for usual meanings of statutory terms).
59. WEBSTER'SNEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISHLANGUAGE
1729 (2d ed. 1943).
60. See supra part III.B.l.
61. See Morton, 814 P.2d at 590.
62. See discussion supra part III.B.l.
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ent manner," or "in another way," it may also be defined as
"contrarily," or more rarely, "on the other hand."63 Inserting
this alternative definition into the Utah statute, subsection (5)
clearly assumes the effect of an exception to the voting group
entitlements created in subsections (1)and (4): "Notwithstanding the rights granted by this section . . . to vote as a separate
voting group, the rights may on the other hand be restricted if
so provided in the original articles of incorporation . . . ." This
alternative definition of "otherwise" reinforces the understanding that subsection (5) constitutes an exception to the voting
group entitlement set forth in subsection (I), rather than excluding the situations described in subsection (1)from the application of subsection (5).
3. Harmonizing the provision with the objectives of the entire
act

As a third method of interpreting critical words, the Utah
Supreme Court has suggested that "[ilf there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an
act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light
of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance
with its intent and p~rpose."~
Reading subsection (5) to permit the restriction of voting
group rights upon condition of sufficient notice or approval
avoids the redundancy and contradictions of the first alternative reading and is consistent with accepted meanings of the
statutory terms. It also comports with one of the general objectives of the Utah Revised Act, as explained in the commentary
to section 601(3):~~
Section 601 authorizes the creation of new or innovative
classes of shares without limitation or restriction. This section
is basically enabling rather than restrictive since corporations
often find it necessary to create new and innovative classes of
shares for a variety of reasons, and with the disclosure of the
terms of the new classes in the articles of incorporation that
are a matter of public record there is no reason to restrict the

63. WEBSTER'SNEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY,
supra note 59, at 1729.
64. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991) (quoting
Osuala v. Aetna Life and Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)).
65. Section 601(3) states: "The articles of incorporation may authorize one or
more classes of shares . . . that: (a) have special, conditional, or limited voting
rights, or no right to vote . . . ." UTAH CODEANN. 5 16-l0a-601(3).
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power to create these classes. . . . Novel classes of shares may
. . . be created in order to effectuate desired control relationships among the participants in the venture?

This commentary hardly compels the reading of subsection
1004(5) as an exception to the right to vote by voting groups,
since the identical statement appears in the Official Comment
to the Model Act:? and there is clearly no such exception in
that statute.68 Nevertheless, the commentary does indicate
that a general purpose behind both Acts is to expand possible
ways in which a corporation may be organized. Furthermore,
those who worked on the Revision Committee have indicated
that the general impetus of the committee in revising the Utah
Business Corporation Act, consistent with the tendency of the
Model Act, was to give greater flexibility to corporations and to
make the provisions for designating classes and series of shares
as liberal as possible.69
In harmony with the general policy of enabling corporations "to create new and innovative classes of shares," and with
the rationale that the terms of a class "are a matter of public
record," subsection 1004(5) of the Utah Revised Act establishes
a means for Utah corporations to create classes and series of
shares with no voting rights at all. Of course, subsection (5)
would be even more effective had the drafters expressed their
intent less ambiguously.

C. Public Policy
The Utah Supreme Court has also indicated that it might
be willing to consider policy arguments if it can find no indication of legislative intent through the usual means of statutory
interpretation. "[Iln the absence of a discernible legislative
intent concerning the specific question in issue, a choice among
permissible interpretations of a statute is largely a policy dete~mination."~~
While there are policy arguments on both

66. COMMENTARY
TO REVISEDACT, supra note 2, at 29.
67. REVISEDMODELBUSINESSCORP.ACT, supra note 7, 5 6.01(d) and cmt.
68. Id. 5 10.04 cmt. at 275-76.
69. Telephone Interview with David K. Redd, Attorney, Kimball Parr
Waddoups Brown & Gee, member of Utah Business Corporation Act Revision Committee (August 9, 1995); Telephone Interview with J. Gordon Hansen, Attorney,
Parsons Behle & Latimer, member of Utah Business Corporation Act Revision
Committee (August 9, 1995).
70. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814
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sides, the more convincing argument favors permitting an exception to the voting group entitlement.
On the one hand, certain problems are raised by reading
subsection 1004(5) as an exception to the right to vote in separate voting groups. Allowing corporations to create classes of
shares that cannot vote, even on amendments that directly
affect the value of their shares, substantially weakens the
drafters' avowed policy of providing "protection for . . . nonvoting shares against amendments that are especially burdensome
to that class."71It should also be noted that shareholders who
are issued shares after restrictions are already in place-either
through a provision in the original articles of incorporation or
subsequent amendment to those articles-are assumed to take
their shares with the knowledge and understanding that those
restrictions apply to their shares. Language in the articles of
incorporation would presumably create constructive notice of
the limits associated with those shares. It may be argued that
reliance on constructive notice potentially leaves room for the
deception or abuse of unwary investors.
On the other hand, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that purchasers of shares in a corporation will make
themselves familiar with the terms associated with their
shares. The commentary to the Utah Revised Act seems comfortably to assume that constructive notice in the articles of
incorporation is entirely adequate." Besides this notice of restrictions, nonvoting shareholders are afforded two levels of
protection for the nine essential interests defined in
5 1004(l)(a)through (i).
First, absent a provision in the articles of incorporation
adopted in a manner prescribed by subsection (5), shareholders
are still entitled under subsections (1)and (4) to vote as a separate voting group on any amendment that would affect their
essential interest^.?^ Second, under subsection (5), this voting
group entitlement is itself afforded heightened protection by
the fact that it may not be waived by an ordinary amendment,

P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991).
71. COMMENTARY
TO REVISEDACT, supra note 2, at 107; see also discussion
supra part 1I.A.
TO REVISEDACT,supra note 2, at 29 ("With the disclo72. See COMMENTARY
sure of the terms of the new classes in the articles of incorporation that are a
matter of public record there is no reason to restrict the power to create these
classes.").
73. UTAHCODEANN. 8 16-10a-1004(1), (4); see supra note 15.
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but only by an amendment approved by affirmative vote of a
majority of the shares within the affected class or series itself.?* Ordinary actions may be approved by a majority of the
voting group members present at the meeting, as long as a
quorum of members is p r e ~ e n t . ?By
~ requiring a majority of
all the shares within the affected class, the drafters of the
Utah statute have imposed stricter voting requirements for the
alienation of the voting group entitlement than for other
amendments, even the "particularly burdensome" amendments
set forth in section 1004(1). This rule treats abstentions and
absentees as negative votes. The combination of these provisions aggressively protects the interests of "nonvoting" shareholders.
Allowing corporations to completely restrict the voting
rights of some shareholders gives the corporation considerably
more freedom, while imposing only minimal burdens on the
shareholders. So long as all interested parties are put on notice
of the voting restrictions associated with their shares before
they acquire them, there is no unfairness in imposing those
burdens on their shares, and no reason to limit the types of
classes or series that a corporation may create. Likewise, there
is no reason why a corporation should not be able to restrict
the voting rights of a given class when the restriction has been
approved by "the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of
the class or series."76Nevertheless, when a class of shareholders brings an action against a corporation for denying them a
right to vote on an amendment that "increase[d] . . . the aggregate number of authorized shares of the class,"77 thus decreasing the value of shares within the class, a court looking at
the equities of the case may be unpersuaded by the public
policy argument for increasing corporate freedom and flexibility
regardless of what the articles of incorporation might say.

IV. CONCLUSION
Under Utah's Revised Business Corporation Act, as under
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, corporations may

74. See id. 5 16-l0a-726; COMMENTARY
TO REVISED
ACT,supra note 2, at 6163.
75. UTAHCODEANN. 9 16-10a-725(3). A quorum is usually simply "a majority
of the votes entitled to be cast." Id. 8 16-10a-725(1).
76. See id. § 16-10a-1004(5).
77. See id. § 1004(l)(a).
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create classes and series of shares that are designated as nonvoting.78However, these shares still have the limited right to
vote as separate voting groups on certain specific kinds of
amendments that would directly affect their interest^.?^ These
limited voting rights cannot be denied to shareholders by ordinary amendments to the articles of incorporation."
Section 1004(5),however, may allow the creation of classes
and series of shares that lack even the limited right to vote on
issues that directly affect the given class or series. The available indications of legislative intent, the more consistent construction of the statute, and the more compelling considerations of public policy all suggest that corporations can create
classes of shares under the Revised Business Corporation Act
that are without voting rights of any kind, so long as this limitation is specifically spelled out in the original articles of incorporation, an amendment that created the shares so restricted, or any other amendment adopted before the shares of the
class or series were first issued." In this way, anyone who
purchases shares that are burdened by a total restriction of
voting rights will have sufficient notice of the limitations associated with those shares. Likewise, restrictions on voting group
rights may be imposed on a class or series by amendment to
the articles of incorporation, but only if approved by a majority
of all shareholders in the affected class or series.82
Although the addition of subsection (5) to Utah's Revised
Business Corporation Act is a laudable extension of the free
agency of Utah corporations, the statute in its current form is
unlikely to achieve the objective that the Revision Committee
and the legislature apparently intended. Because the statute is
written so ambiguously, and because the commentary published with the Utah Revised Act fails to explain how Utah's
statutory innovation allows corporations to restrict voting
group rights, corporations that might otherwise take advantage
of the new statute will be rightfully hesitant to do so under the
current law. The ambiguity of Utah's section 1004 invites disgruntled shareholders to sue the first corporation that attempts

78. Id. $ 16-10a-601(3)(a);REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
$ 6.01(c)(l).
79. UTAHCODE ANN. 8 1004(1).
80. Id. $ 1004(4).
81. Id. $ 1004(5).
82. Id.

ACT,supra note 7,
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to restrict voting rights in the ways apparently authorized by
subsection 1004(5). And while a company's right to restrict
voting rights under 1004(5)would probably be upheld in court,
few companies will want to go to court to vindicate such a
right.
If, however, a corporation should decide that it nevertheless wants to create a class or series of shares with absolutely
no voting rights, it is essential that these restrictions be plainly
spelled out in (i) the original articles of incorporation drafted a t
the inception of the corporation, (ii) an amendment to the articles that is prior to or contemporaneous with the issuance of
the affected shares, or (iii) an amendment authorized by a
resolution adopted by the affirmative vote of a majority of the
affected shareholders. It might also be wise to list and explicitly deny the right to vote on each of the nine types of
amendments set forth in subsection 1004(1),rather than simply
relying on a statement that the class or series is nonvoting "for
all purpose^."^^ Even after taking these precautions a corporation might think twice about antagonizing a "nonvoting" class
of shares by proposing amendments particularly burdensome to
the class and denying the class members any opportunity to
vote on the amendment.
The best solution to the problems associated with section
1004 of the Utah Revised Act would be for the Utah Legislature to resolve the ambiguities of that section by amending it.
A simple amendment, such as striking out the word "otherwise"
in subsection (5) or replacing it with the word "nevertheless"
would make the meaning of the statute more clear. Any such
amendment should be accompanied by changes to the Commentary as well. A short paragraph explaining the presence and
import of subsection (5) would clarify the purpose of the statute
and make it more usefiLg4 Although a legislative intent is

83. See COMMENTARYTO REVISEDACT, supra note 2, a t 107 (stating that
"[elven if a class or series of shares is described as 'nonvoting' and the articles
purport to make that class or series nonvoting 'for all purposes,' that class or series nevertheless has the limited voting right provided by [section 10041").
84. This paragraph might read as follows: Subsection 1004(5) was included in
the Revised Act and subsections (1) and (4) were amended to create an exception
to the right described in subsections (1) and (4) of voting in separate voting
groups. The change was made in order to permit corporations to create classes and
series of shares with no voting rights of any kind, thus giving boards of directors
and voting shareholders more control over their corporations. The complete restriction of shareholder voting rights contemplated by subsection (5) is permitted subject to certain procedural safeguards designed to insure that affected shareholders
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discernable in section 16-10a-1004, the ambiguity inherent in
the statute in its present form creates a risk that that intent
will be fhstrated.
Erik G. Davis

are given notice of the restrictions affecting their shares before they buy them, or
approve the restrictions subsequent to purchase by an affirmative vote of the
shareholders affected by the proposed change.

